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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS

of Section 605, due regard to federal-state relations
precluded the conclusion that Congress intended
to thwart a state rule of evidence in the absence of
a clear indication to that effect." '32 However, since
the Benanti case involved a federal action in a
federal court, the Court declined to recognize any
infringement of the federal-state relationship in
rejecting the state procured wire tap evidence.
The significance of the Benanti case lies in the
fact that the decision makes a practical application
of the inherent policy in the federal exclusionary
rule. While the Court will not interfere with the
state use of illegal wire tap evidence in state courts
where no federal question is involved, it will not
permit, on the same theory of non-interference with
states' rights, the use of such evidence in a federal
court. In this way the states' internal judicial procedure is protected, and uniformity in the administration of the federal exclusionary rule in federal
courts is obtained.
Although the Supreme Court has not been in a
position to decide the specific question in issue
since the Wolf case, Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter have at least acknowl3-It was urged by the government that as long as the
wiretapping occurred without the participation or even
knowledge of federal law enforcement officers, the
evidence should be admitted in the federal court. The
Sclrwartz case was heavily relied upon. The Court
answered, "However, Schwarts v. Teans does not indicate approval of such a proposition. Both a state court
and state law enforcement officers were there involved. The rationale of that case is that despite the
plain prohibition of Section 605, due regard to federalstate relations precluded the conclusion that Congress
intended to thwart a state rule of evidence in the
absence of a clear indication to that effect. In the
instant case we are not dealing with a state rule of
evidence. Although state agents committed the wiretap. we are presented with a Federal conviction
brought about in part by a violation of a Federal law, in
this case in Federal court". Benanti v. United States,
supra note 31 at 101.
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edged that Weeks can no longer be a foundation for
the rule and that the question is now open.3
Of greater significance are the statements of
several of the other Justices on this point. Justices
Black and Douglas have definitely expressed their
opinion that all illegally seized evidence should be
excluded in the federal courts regardless of the
searcher's affiliation. 34 Mr. Justice Clark has also
expressed his dissatisfaction with the Wolf case,35
and has stated that all evidence "obtained in violation of rights protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution must be excluded
'
in federal criminal prosecutions.

6

Certainly, the Weeks holding can not now properly be regarded as a binding precedent. The
Supreme Court should come to grips with the
problem and maintain a uniform rule of evidence
regarding unconstitutional action. The illegal actions on the part of state and federal officers are
equally repugnant to the federal constitution and
the fruits of their illegal ventures should be treated
similarly in the federal courts.
" Mr. Chief Justice Warren noted that "it remains
an open question in this Court whether evidence obtained solely by state agents in an illegal search may be
admissible in federal court despite the Fourth Amendment". Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102, ft.
10 (1957). See also note 11, supra.
4Mr.
Justice Douglas, concurring in Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74, 80, (1949) stated: "[T]he
important consideration is the presence of an illegal
search. Whether state or federal officials did the searching is of no consequence to the defendant, and it should
make no difference to us." Mr. Justice Black also concurred in Lustig, basing it on his dissent in Feldman v.
United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944). This case involved
the use in federal courts of evidence obtained by the
state under a state immunity statute. Mr. Justice
Black stated: "Testimony is no less compelled because
the state officer appears to be primarily interested at
the moment in enforcing a state rather than a federal
law."
35 See Clark, J., concurring in Irvine v. California,
3473 6 U.S. 128, 138 (1954).
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 434 (1957).

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Francis A. Heroux
Presence Of Victim's Wife At Counsel Table
During Trial Not Prejudicial-This was a prosecution for murder in the first degree. During the
course of the trial the victim's wife occupied a chair
at the counsel's table next to the state's prosecutor.
When her husband's bloody shirt was exhibited to
the jury, she became emotionally upset to the extent that the trial judge asked her to leave the

courtroom; this she did, in the company of a baliff.
The defendant appealed his conviction on the
ground that the presence of the decedent's wife
prejudiced the jury because sympathy for her affected the jury's deliberations. The Court of Appeals of Ohio held that there was nothing to indicate bad faith on the part of the prosecutor or that
the wife's presence was used in any improper
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manner. Therefore, no prejudice resulted. State v.
Bryant, 152 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio 1958).
In reaching its decision, the court noted that it
was within the province of the prosecuting attorney
to make the choice of the person to assist him in the
development of the case for the state. Furthermore,
there was no emotion on the part of the victim's
wife, other than that which normally might follow
when the bloody shirt which her husband wore at
the time he was killed was produced and exhibited
to the jury. In conclusion, the court said, "It may
be that her appearance and her testimony evoked
sympathy, as it naturally would, on the part of the
jury, but this is inevitable in the trial of a criminal
case where the facts developed tend to stir the
emotions."

Defendant's Partner In Incest Was VictimNot Accomplice-The defendant was convicted
of the crime of incest. At his trial, the only evidence
for the State was the uncorroborated testimony of
the prosecutrix, defendant's daughter. Her testimony established that the defendant had been
carrying on his illicit relationship with her, which
was begun when she was thirteen years old and
continued almost daily until she was seventeen
years old. The daughter was completely dependent
on her father for support and was afraid of him.
The defendant appealed his conviction on the
ground that the prosecutrix's testimony had to be
corroborated. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
rejected this contention and affirmed the conviction, holding that the daughter was a victim and
not an accomplice; therefore, her testimony was
not required to be corroborated. The defendant
urged that the prosecuting witness was an accomplice and that he could not be convicted on her
testimony alone. His argument was that initially
she may have been the victim of his odious actions, but that during the ensuing four-year period
there came a time when she acquiesced and therefore became an accomplice. Lusby v. Maryland,
141 A.2d 893 (1958).
The court agreed that the question of whether a
participant in an incestuous relationship is an accomplice or a victim must depend upon the facts.
In this case, however, there was sufficient evidence
that, although the daughter had assented to the
sexual union with her father, she had not consented
to it. The evidence points out that the incestuous
relationship was odious to her. She was afraid of

her father and her dependence on him compelled
her to live with him. Furthermore, the brunt of
proving that the witness is an accomplice is upon
the party alleging it. The defendant had not met
this burden.

False Answers On Voir Dire Are Grounds
for Reversal-The defendant was charged with
unlawfully accepting a bet on a horse race. During
the voir dire examination of the jury, the defense
counsel posed the question whether any of the jury
would be prejudiced by the nature of a bookmaking
case. All of the jurors answered in the negative.
Thereupon, these jurors found the defendant
guilty. The defendant appealed, charging misconduct of a juror. Upon affidavits of the jurors, it was
determined that the foreman of the jury had told
the others that he could explain all about bookmaking to them. He stated that he knew a great
deal about things such as bookmaking, for he had
in fact lost his house to a bookmaker. Thereafter,
this juror spent approximately fifteen minutes explaining to the other jurors the use of a scratch
sheet, how bets were made, and about various
means of gambling. The Court of Appeals of California held that this was misconduct of the juror
and that since the case had been a close one the
conviction must be reversed. People v. Castaldia,
328 P.2d 1016 (Calif. App. 1958).
The court stated that the conduct of the juror
in giving false answers to the question put to him
on the voir dire constituted misconduct or irregularity sufficient to warrant a new trial. Of course,
the granting of a new trial depended upon the case
itself. On a consideration of the entire record, the
court could not say that in the absence of the misconduct a different verdict would have been improbable. Consequently, the misconduct constituted a miscarriage of justice.

Comment By Judge As To Punishment Held
Proper--The defendant was convicted of murder
in the first degree for the violent rape and murder
of a young girl. After all the evidence had been
presented at the trial, the judge commented on it.
Before beginning his comments, the judge pointed
out to the jurors that they were free to reject anything which did not coincide with their views and
that they were the judges of the evidence. Furthermore, it was up to them to decide what was to be
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done with the defendant so far as any penalty was
concerned. The judge's comments indicated in a
general way his view that the penalty should be
death. He particularized his reasons for this view,
saying that in his opinion the defendant showed
no remorse and that the defendant had not fully
disclosed details of the crime which were known to
him nor had he answered important questions on
cross-examination. The defendant claimed that the
judge's statements were outside the bounds of
proper judicial comment. The Supreme Court of
California affirmed the conviction, holding that
the judge's comments relating to the penalty involved were properly within the court's power to
"make such comment on the evidence and the
testimony as in its opinion is necessary for the determination of the case." Three judges dissented.
People v. Friend, 327 P.2d 97 (Calif. 1958).
The majority stated that the extent to which a
judge is free to comment on the evidence is shown
by the fact that it has frequently been recognized
that a judge may express his opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of a defendant. "There is no justification," states the majority opinion, "for holding
that a judge has a lesser right to comment on the
evidence where punishment is involved than where
matters relating to guilt are in issue. The same
principles should be applied in determining whether
the power has been properly exercised." In any
event, the judge's warning to the jury prior to
making his comments sufficiently protected the
defendant's rights.
Contrary to the majority's position, the dissenters believe there is a clear distinction between
judicial comment on matters of punishment as
opposed to matters of guilt. The dissent states,
"There is justification-indeed not only justification but necessity, if we are to abide by the law
previously enunciated-for holding that a judge
has a lesser right to comment on the evidence where
punishment is involved than where matters relating to guilt are in issue". They believe the difference is an obvious one. Guilt must depend on evidence and only on evidence, and the judge may comment on evidence; hence, he may indicate an opinion as to the fact which depends on evidence. However, where punishment (as in a first degree murder
case) is involved, the solution of the penalty need
not depend in any degree whatsoever on the evidence and, under the legislative plan, must always
include exercise of an absolute and unfettered dis-
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cretion. This discretion belongs to the jury alone.
according to the minority opinion.

Indigent Prisoner Must Allege Specific Error
To Get Free Transcript-This was a petition for a
writ of error to review convictions of incest, statutory rape, and comission of unnatural acts.
Petitioner moved that he be furnished a free transscript of the evidence at his trial. He alleged in his
motion that he was an indigent person and that
without a copy of the transcript he could not effectively present his argument upon his writ of
error. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts denied
his petition, holding that adequate appellate review by a writ of error did not require that the
petitioner be furnished a free transcript of evidence
in the absence of a showing of reasonable need for
the transcript. Guerin v. Massachusetts, 149 N.E.2d
220 (Mass. 1958).
The petitioner rested his argument upon Griffin
v. Illinwis, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), which he contended
requires the state to provide him with a transcript
"as a matter of due process." The court rejected
this argument, noting that in the Grifin case the
state of Illinois had considered that a transcript
was needed for adequate appellate review. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Griffin left open the
possibility that a state may have other means of
affording adequate and effective appellate review
to indigent defendants.
In Massachusetts, a transcript of the testimony
in the trial of proceedings is not required to secure
adequate appellate review. For example, a bystander's bill of exceptions, the trial judge's notes,
or other methods of reporting may be used. The
petitioner did not use these other methods, but
instead chose to wait three years until they were
not available and then sought a writ of error. Furthermore, his petition only made vague and sweeping suggestions of violations of rights under the
United States Constitution and the Massachusetts
Constitution. Thus, the court thought that there
should be something more than such a broad general charge wholly lacking in specification before
the state must provide a free transcript for the
prosecution of a writ of error.

Information Gained From Income Tax Returns May Be Basis For Peremptory Challenges
To Jurors-The defendant was convicted of willful

